In the recent case of Doucette v. Georgetown Pub. Sch., No. 18-1160 (1st Cir. 2019), the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals issued a very important decision regarding the concept of “exhaustion.” Previously, the rule of thumb for special education attorneys was that if a case involved Section 504 or ADA claims by a student against a school district, the case needed to be heard by the Bureau of Special Education Appelas (“BSEA”) (or in New Hampshire, the Department of Education (“DOE”)) before it could be heard in federal court. This was true, even if the BSEA / DOE did not have the authority to grant the requested remedy, such as damages. Doucette applied and extended the reasoning outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 197 L.Ed.2d 46 (2017).
[Note: For purposes of this blog article, I will be referring to the BSEA. However, since both Massachusetts and New Hampshire are part of the 1st Circuit, everything discussed applies to both the Massachusetts BSEA and the New Hampshire DOE.]
Concept of Exhaustion
If you are the parent of a special education child, you probably know all about exhaustion, but more from the perspective of physical or emotional fatigue. The legal concept of exhaustion is quite different. In the law, exhaustion is short for “exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “exhaustion of remedies” as:
The doctrine that, if an administrative remedy is provided by statute, a claimant must seek relief first from the administrative body before judicial relief is available.Black’s Law Dictionary, 594 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999)
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) is the federal set of laws governing special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. IDEA does contain such an exhaustion requirement:
Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,Fry, 137 S.Ct. at 750, quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Rehabilitation Act [including § 504 ], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the [IDEA’s administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under [the IDEA].
In other words, if you are claiming that the school district owes your child something because the district violated the ADA or Section 504, and if you could also make a similar claim and get similar relief under IDEA, you need to start your legal proceedings at the BSEA / DOE. But what if the relief you are seeking is available under the ADA / 504, but is not available under IDEA – for example, financial damages (hearing officers are not authorized to award damages)? The case law in the First Circuit has generally held that you still need to start at the BSEA / DOE, if for no other reason than just to establish the administrative record for the benefit of the federal court.
- If the gravamen of a Rehabilitation Act (Section 504) claim does not involve the denial of a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”), does the plaintiff still need to exhaust administrative remedies through the BSEA before proceeding to federal court?
- If pursuing a case at the BSEA would be futile, must the parents still exhaust their administrative remedies at the BSEA before proceeding to federal court?
- The student, B.D., had a rare genetic disorder which caused numerous physical and developmental disabilities, and increased the risk of sudden unexpected death correlated with seizure activity.
- B.D. attended elementary school in Georgetown between the ages of three and six (July 2009 through August 2012). He was on an IEP. Parents and school district disagreed about his services.
- Parents temporarily removed B.D. from school in May 2010, and filed for hearing at the BSEA in July 2010. Parents sought an out-of-district placement. The BSEA Hearing Officer agreed that the IEP was inadequate, but did not order a new placement.
- In the fall of 2011, B.D. began working with a service dog to help him with anxiety and balance, and to alert caretakers of any impending seizures. In November 2011, Parents requested that the school district permit the dog at school as a disability accommodation. The school district initially refused outright, but then offered access to the service animal if the parents agreed to a school policy regarding the dog’s handling. The parents refused that offer, and claimed that the school district violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The school district then ordered a behavioral assessment to take place during the following school year to determine whether his IEP should be amended to include a service dog.
- J.B. Comment: It is unclear from the decision what the school district’s policy was, or why the parents believed that the policy violated the ADA. Footnote 8 of the decision provides some foreshadowing by stating that this issue “will undoubtedly be an important issue to the future viability of the Doucettes’ section 504 claim, but it is not an issue in this appeal.”
- J.B. Comment: It is not clear from the decision how much time elapsed from November 2011 until the school district ordered a behavioral assessment, and then from the time that the assessment was ordered until the following school year when the district actually intended for the assessment to occur.
- In the summer of 2012, when B.D. was participating in the school district’s ESY program (i.e. summer school), he experienced a tonic-clonic seizure for over 20 minutes and required hospitalization. Parents demanded an immediate amendment to the IEP to grant him access to a service dog. This request was denied, but the district offered to allow the dog if the mother would act as the dog’s handler. After the denial, and into September 2012, B.D. suffered four more seizures
- J.B. Comment: An argument can be made that since the parents were requesting an amendment to the IEP, this became a FAPE issue. On the other hand, they were not the ones who initially requested an update to the IEP – it was the school district that responded to the Parents’ initial request for a service dog accommodation by suggesting a possible amendment to the IEP. Basically, the school district drew the Parents into a FAPE disagreement.
- B.D. continued to have seizures and hospitalizations. The parents eventually removed B.D. from school and again requested an alternative school placement. B.D.’s doctor wrote a letter expressing concern about the school district’s ability to handle B.D.’s health and safety, and recommended that B.D. be kept out of school until a safe placement could be identified. The school district wrote back that any extended absences would be considered truancy.
- In September 2012, Parents relented, and sent B.D. back to school. However, he had yet another tonic-clonic seizure, requiring hospitalization. Finally, the school district agreed to evaluate out-of-district placements, and in fact agreed to a new placement. B.D. did not experience any further seizures following removal from the school district.
- In 2015, the Doucettes filed suit in U.S. District Court alleging (1) state law tort claims, as well as federal claims under (2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and (3) 42 USC §1983.
- The District Court ruled against the parents on their federal law claims, stating that the parents failed to exhaust the IDEA administrative remedies. The court also declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Summary of Key Regulations and Statutes Referenced in the Decision
- Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 USC §794): Section 504 requires public entities (including, but not limited to schools) to make reasonable modifications to their existing practices in order to accommodate disabled persons. Such modifications include support services. Alexander v. Choate, 469 US 287, 299 – 300 (1985). “IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, while Title II and § 504 promise non-discriminatory access to public institutions.” Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 756.
- Section 1983: This applies to everyone within the United States (not just disabled individuals), protecting everybody from deprivation of any federal rights by anyone acting under state law.
- Exhaustion Requirement: This concept is described above. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its Fry decision, provided the following guidance regarding exhaustion:
- The key to determining whether exhaustion at the state administrative level must occur is whether the gravamen of the claim concerns FAPE. If it does concern FAPE, then exhaustion must occur at the state administrative level before a claim can be made in federal court; if it does not concern FAPE, then the case can proceed directly to federal court without exhaustion at the state administrative level. Fry 137 S. Ct. at 754.
- The Supreme Court provided two “clues” to determine whether the case is related to FAPE:
- “could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct that occurred at a public facility that was not school?” and
- “could an adult at the school… Have pressed essentially the same grievance?”. Id. at 756 – 757.
Doucette § 504 Analysis
Regarding the 504 claim, the Doucette court looked to the Fry “clues” to determine that the 504 claim was not related to FAPE, and therefore exhaustion was not required. First, the the court stated that the plaintiff could have brought essentially the same claim against any public facility – not just a school. For example, if a movie theater, restaurant, hotel, or store failed to accommodate somebody by not allowing a service dog, that facility would be subject to a similar claim in federal court, without the plaintiff having to exhaust claims at the state administrative level. Doucette at 17 – 19. This reasoning is similar to Fry, where the “complaint alleges only disability-based discrimination, without making any reference to the adequacy of the special education services…” Fry at 137 S. Ct. at 758.
Doucette also utilized the second clue from Fry. Specifically, the court stated that a nonstudent (e.g. a teacher) could bring essentially the same claim against the school district if they were denied use of a service dog. Doucette p. 18.
The majority decision in Doucette also addressed several other arguments. One argument was that because the Doucettes previously engaged in a BSEA due process hearing regarding FAPE in 2010, the current dispute regarding the service dog must be related and must also concern FAPE. The court disagreed. The majority pointed out that the Doucettes did not raise the service dog issue until November 2011, well after the BSEA due process decision was issued. Id. at 20 – 21.
Another argument addressed by the court was that because the Doucettes eventually requested that B.D.’s IEP be updated to include reference to a service animal, the gravamen of their complaint concerned FAPE (and therefore exhaustion would be required). The court disagreed. The majority pointed out that the Doucettes initially requested the service dog without reference to the IEP. It was the school district that responded to the Doucette’s service dog request by ordering an assessment to take place to determine whether the IEP should be updated. Id. at 22.
Regarding the pure 504 vs. FAPE discussion, the majority pointed out that a student at risk of seizures who needs a service dog in school is not much different, legally, than a wheelchair-bound student who requires ramps in order to get into the school building. Neither case concerns educational services; both cases concern access. Id. at 23.
The mere fact that a student might require both accommodations under Section 504 and educational services under IDEA does not mean that all claims related to the student and the school must be exhausted at the state administrative level. To have such a requirement would discriminate against disabled students. Id. at 24 – 25.
Plain and simple, the 504 claim concerned a public institution’s denial of nondiscriminatory access to an individual by failing to accommodate use of a service dog, and the harm (i.e. seizures) that resulted from that denial; the 504 claim did not concern the school district’s obligation to provide a particular education program (i.e. FAPE). Doucette at 16 – 17.
Doucette § 1983 Analysis
Unlike the § 504 claim, the §1983 claim was very much related to FAPE. Here, the parents made a claim that the school district had notice that the placement was inappropriate, and that the district’s refusal to allow a different placement, and subsequent threatening of truancy, “amounted to ‘deliberate indifference in severe, pervasive disregard for [the] safety and well-being [of] B.D.’ and that, as a result, B.D. ‘suffer[ed] great physical and emotional harm,’ including ‘five [ ] life-threatening tonic-clonic seizures.’” Doucette at pp. 26 – 27. The Doucette court applied the Fry clues to conclude that FAPE was very much an issue. Doucette at 27.
Nonetheless, the court still ruled that the plaintiffs were not required to file at the state administrative level for several reasons:
1. Exhaustion was met. The Doucettes had a due process hearing in 2010. In July 2012, they again requested an alternative placement. They again brought the dispute to the attention of the local school district. They eventually received the relief they were looking for. However, the § 1983 claim did not concern whether the placement was appropriate or not; it concerned the harm that B.D. suffered as a result of the school district’s delay in providing the relief. Doucette at pp. 30 – 31.
2. Exhaustion was not necessarily even required. The Doucettes were seeking relief that was not available to them under IDEA – money damages for physical or emotional harm. Therefore, “§1415 (l) does not appear to require exhaustion of the Doucette’s constitutional claim…” Id. at 32.
3. Pursuing a claim at the state administrative level would have been futile. Hearing officers do not have the authority to provide the relief that the Doucettes were seeking. They are not authorized to award money damages for physical or emotional harm. Id. at 32. Hearing officers are limited to providing equitable relief in the form of educational services, compensatory services, and reimbursement for education -related expenses. Id. at 34.
The court acknowledged that FAPE-based claims can benefit from the administrative process, because such a hearing will develop the evidentiary record based on the specialized knowledge of education professionals. However, the court stated that such a record had already been developed through the 2010 due process hearing, as well as through the Doucette’s 2012 pursuit of an educational placement.
JB Comment: On the one hand, this particular argument seems ripe for appeal. Part of the record that the court refers to was not developed under oath, or in front of the hearing officer. The court is simply referring to documents which often become evidence that a hearing officer will weigh in a due process hearing. On the other hand, even if the court will benefit from further litigation in order to develop the evidentiary record, this one issue alone does not seem to be vital enough to require the cost and delay of further litigation at the state level. In fact, an alternative argument could be made that engaging in such litigation, knowing that a hearing officer does not have the authority to award the relief requested, amounts to frivolous litigation that only serves to increase the cost to both sides.
The Doucette decision is very important for special education cases which involve non-FAPE matters in the 1st Circuit. If an attorney representing a parent is considering whether to file a claim in federal court before litigating the issue at the BSEA / DOE, the attorney should first apply and analyze the clues provided by the Supreme Court in Fry, and applied in the 1st Circuit in Doucette.
The Law Office of James M. Baron represents students and parents in special education and other school-related legal matters throughout Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Please visit https://www.lawbaron.com, or call 781-209-1166 for more information.
When you have been harmed, and you need to take legal action against another party, you probably think of a lawsuit between a plaintiff and defendant. But what if you, as the plaintiff, cannot get complete relief from taking action against just one party? Or what if the relief sought by the plaintiff would result in an unfair burden placed on the defendant? In those types of cases, it might be necessary to “Join” a third party, thereby making that third party part of the lawsuit.
For matters dealing with special education, a due process hearing is the equivalent of a lawsuit in court. Each state has its own administrative body which adjudicates due process hearings. In Massachusetts, the administrative body is called the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (“BSEA”). The BSEA Hearing Rules for Special Education Appeals list factors that a Hearing Officer should consider when a request is made to join a third party (See BSEA Hearing Rule 1(J) in the above link).
The factors defined in Rule 1(J) are:
- The risk of prejudice to the present parties in the absence of the proposed party;
- The range of alternatives for fashioning relief;
- The inadequacy of a judgment entered in the proposed party’s absence; and
- The existence of an alternative forum to resolve the issues.
Two recent rulings from the BSEA provide excellent examples of how a Hearing Officer applies the above factors to a real-life situation. In the case of Student v. North Middlesex Regional School District & Department of Children and Families (22 MSER 156 (2016)), the parents filed a BSEA due process hearing request against both the school district (“NMR”) and the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) seeking a six month residential placement to address the student’s chronic stress. DCF believed that it should not be joined as a party, and filed a Motion to Dismiss. The school district, on the other hand, was opposed to removing DCF as a joined party.
Hearing Officer Rosa Figueroa ruled in favor of the parents and the school district in denying DCF’s Motion to Dismiss. Although DCF did not have care or custody of the student, it did provide a Treatment Plan and also arranged for a neuropsychological evaluation of the student, so there was a pre-existing relationship between the student and DCF. The hearing decision documents the school district’s argument:
NMR argued that the scope of the Hearing therefore involves not only Student’s need for residential placement but also: a) whether her current private day placement offers her a FAPE; b) whether Student requires additional in-home or residential services; (3) whether those in-home or residential services would be educational in nature; and d) if not educational in nature, whether DCF is responsible to provide them. Moreover, according to NMR, given that Student and her family are currently receiving services under a Treatment Plan Document (June 1, 2016 Treatment Plan Document) it would appear that any difficulty experienced by Student in the home is attributable to the home environment rather than unmet educational needs, therefore, a private day placement for Student would suffice to offer her a FAPE in the least restrictive environment. Since a determination of the need for residential placement and/or home wrap-around services, as well as whether such services would be for educational reasons may involve orders against NMR and DCF, the BSEA would be unable to fashion the necessary remedies in the absence of DCF. Lastly, NMR argued that administrative efficiency could only be assured by maintaining DCF as a party.
22 MSER 156 (2016). Hearing Officer Figueroa agreed that “the existence of an active and comprehensive Treatment Plan establishes enough of a relationship to allow the BSEA to order non-residential services (such as additional home-based or therapeutic services) consistent with DCF’s rules and regulations, that are necessary to enable Student to receive a FAPE.” Id. In other words, since there was at least a possibility that DCF’s services might be needed in order for the student to be able to receive her Free and Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”), DCF needed to stay involved as a joined party in the case.
It is important to realize that the ruling against DCF’s Motion to Dismiss does not mean that the parents won their residential placement. This Motion was just one aspect of the larger overall litigation. The decision simply kept DCF involved as part of the case.
In the second case, Student & Natick Public Schools (22 MSER 159 (2016)), the result was the exact opposite (DCF was not joined), but for reasons that are very much in line with the North Middlesex case. In Natick, it was the parent who tried to join DCF “because she asserts that DCF was ‘complicit’ with alleged actions by Natick that Parent believes deprived Student of a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) and created a ‘hostile environment’ within the Natick Public Schools. Parent’s position is that… DCF (among others) collaborated with Natick to deprive Student of her rights.” 22 MSER 159 (2016).
The facts in Natick show that Natick did apply for a Child Requiring Assistance (CRA) petition with the Juvenile Court. Natick also filed a 51A report with DCF because of concerns about the students school attendance. However, the student was never under DCF care or custody, DCF did not have an open case on the student or her family, and DCF was not providing any services to student or the family.
Hearing Officer Sara Berman provided an excellent summary of the factors that a Hearing Officer considers in determining joinder:
In general, factors that hearing officers consider in determining whether the criteria of 603 CMR 28.08(3) and Rule I.J have been met include the following:
- The student’s eligibility for services from the agency;
- status (or lack thereof) as a current client of the agency;
- length and degree of involvement that the agency already has with the student, if any;
- likelihood that the evidence at hearing will show that the student needs services that only are available from the agency to benefit from special education, that the agency has refused or failed to provide such services, and that no appropriate forum exists to contest the agency’s decision;
- likelihood that an order to the school district alone will provide the student with FAPE;
- administrative efficiency of joining a potentially responsible state agency early in the proceeding.
On the other hand, the BSEA has declined to join human services agencies in situations where the agency has found the student ineligible or has not determined eligibility under its own regulations, where the student is eligible only for minimal services from the agency, or where agency involvement in the future is theoretically possible but speculative.
22 MSER 159 (2016). The Hearing Officer concluded:
DCF should not be joined as a party in the instant case because none of the criteria for joinder listed in the “Legal Frameworks” section of this Ruling have been met. Student is not a current client of DCF. She is not in DCF care or custody, voluntary or otherwise, and receives no DCF services. Moreover, Parents seek no DCF services for Student and/or their family now, and there is no evidence in the parties submissions that they intend to do so in the future… [C]omplete relief, i.e. all relief sought by Parent from the BSEA, can be granted without DCF as a party. There is no risk of prejudice to any existing party if DCF is not joined because there is no remedy that the BSEA can order against DCF.
Id. Through these two cases, we can see how a very similar approach and analysis resulted in polar opposite decisions because the facts of the cases were so different.
The Law Office of James M. Baron represents students and parents in special education and other school-related legal matters throughout Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Please visit http://www.lawbaron.com, or call 781-209-1166 for more information.
Stay put is the mechanism intended to ensure stability for students while parents and school districts work out their disputes. Under 20 U.S.C. §1415(j), “during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child…” Similarly, in Massachusetts, under 28 CMR 28.08 (7), “during the pendency of any dispute regarding placement or services, the eligible student shall remain in his or her then current education program and placement unless the parents and the school district agree otherwise.” New Hampshire’s stay put regulation is Ed. 1123.23.
So, what happens if a student is in an out-of-district placement, which the parent approves of, but the school district wins at due process for a different placement, and the parent appeals to federal court? This was the scenario in a recent decision handed down by the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals. In the case of In Re: Boston Public Schools v. Student – BSEA # 15-03083 & BSEA # 14-01653, a Boston student was attending the READS Collaborative, pursuant to a prior stay put decision of the BSEA. Boston then filed for a hearing, asking the BSEA to rule that its proposed placement at a different school – the Horace Mann School – was appropriate for the student. Boston won that due process hearing. Ordinarily, this would mean that the student would need to start attending the Horace Mann School instead of READS. However, the Parent in this case appealed to the U.S. District Court.
The dispute then became the issue of what the stay put placement should be. The Parent claimed that stay put should be READS, since that was the then-current placement of the student. Boston argued that stay put should be the Horace Mann School, since that was the decision of the BSEA hearing officer.
Hearing Officer Rosa Figueroa ruled in favor of the Parent. The reasoning for this decision was that the student’s then-current placement was indeed the READS Collaborative. Even though Boston won the case at the BSEA in favor of the Horace Mann School, the fact that the Parent appealed the case to U.S. District Court meant that there were still legal proceedings that were pending. To ensure stability for the student, the hearing officer maintained READS as stay put while the dispute worked its way through the system.
The Law Office of James M. Baron represents students and parents in special education and other school-related legal matters throughout Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Please visit http://www.lawbaron.com, or call 781-209-1166 for more information.
A statute of limitations defines how long you have to bring a legal action. With special education matters, if you are going to file for a due process hearing, the general rule is that you have 2 years to file for a hearing regarding any alleged violation. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B). If you make a unilateral placement (i.e. make a “unilateral” decision to enroll your child in a private school without school district approval), NH has significantly limited the time period that is allowed for filing for a hearing related to that placement. In particular, New Hampshire allows just 90 days for filing for a hearing regarding the unilateral placement. RSA 186-C:16-b. The 90 days runs from the date the unilateral placement is made. Further complicating this is that the date of the unilateral placement is not always clearcut. For example, is it:
- The date that the parents applied to the private school?
- The date that the private school accepted the student?
- The date that the parents returned the acceptance letter to the private school?
- The date that the parents sent in their first deposit to the private school?
- The date that payment was made in full?
- The date that the parents notified the public school district that they were withdrawing their child from the public school, and enrolling him or her at the private school?
Parents might have a bit of a reprieve from the 90 day burden if the school district did not provide the parents with notice of their special education rights, which they usually do at least annually. If notice was not given, then the 90 days would not start running until proper notice is given to the parents.
The exact wording of the NH law is:
186-C:16-b Due Process Hearing; Appeal. –I. Any action against a local school district seeking to enforce special education rights under state or federal law shall be commenced by requesting an administrative due process hearing from the department of education within 2 years of the date on which the alleged violation was or reasonably should have been discovered.
II. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I, any action against a local school district to recover the costs of a unilateral special education placement shall be commenced by requesting an administrative due process hearing from the department of education within 90 days of the unilateral placement.
III. Where the parent, legal guardian or surrogate parent has not been given proper written notice of special education rights pursuant to 20 U.S.C. section 1415(d), including notice of the time limitations established in this section, such limitations shall run from the time notice of those rights is properly given. The department of education shall make available a model notice of rights which school districts may use as one means of complying with this paragraph.
The following table summarizes some of the key statistics for Fiscal Year 2012 that were recently published by the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA). There are a couple of points worth highlighting:
- Out of 8,460 rejected IEP’s, there were only 52 due process hearings with decisions. Why? Most cases reach resolution prior to a hearing. In other words, based on the statistics, there is only a 0.6% likelihood that any rejected IEP will actually go all the way through to a complete Hearing.
- Of the 52 decisions that were rendered, parents prevailed in just 13 cases. That represents just 25% of the BSEA decisions.
What is the lesson here for parents? Proceed with caution when it comes to litigation. As an attorney, I judge my success not by the number of cases litigated, but by the number of positive outcomes achieved (preferably without litigation).
|Actual Hearings with Formal Decisions||48||50||35||52|
Have you ever heard of “Procedures Lite?” If not, don’t feel bad. Very few people have, though you will probably be seeing reference to this more and more.
Federal and state special education laws grant numerous rights to parents, and create numerous requirements for public school systems, to ensure that disabled children are provided with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) in the Least Restrictive Environment (LRE). Anyone who has been involved with creating or implementing an IEP, or dealing with disputes that may crop up regarding a child’s education, can attest to the large overhead that is involved with special education.
Procedures Lite is an attempt by school districts to avoid the time, paperwork, cost and accountability that are required by federal and state special education laws. Here’s how you will “ benefit:”
- You will “agree to suspend state and federal special education procedural requirements…”
- You will “understand that an Individualized Education Program (IEP) will be replaced by a one-page Student Learning Plan (SLP)…”
- You will agree not to:
_____convene the Team meeting to develop an IEP.
_____develop an IEP.
_____ send/receive periodic parent notices.
_____conduct procedurally required evaluations
- You will agree to “forever WAIVE [your] rights to appeal all issues under all state and federal laws… including all rights related to compensatory services or damages.”
Is Procedures Lite sanctioned by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) or the Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA)? I can find no reference to it in any state or federal website or communication, yet its advocates will have you believe that it is sanctioned by the DESE. The Town of Weston – the only district of which I am aware that openly makes reference to this procedure – states, “DESE identifies the purposes of Procedures Lite as follows… DESE suggests that Procedures Lite agreements be limited….” http://bit.ly/owsn9r.
I can’t think of any good reason for parents to agree to the use of Procedures Lite. I see lots of benefits for the school districts, but none for the parents. Is a district asks you to utilize Procedures Lite, would you mind notifying my office? I would like to keep a running list of districts attempting to utilize Procedures Lite. Thank you.
For further information about the Law Office of James M. Baron, please visit http://www.lawbaron.com,or call 781-209-1166.